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The study by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics concludes that Foot-
ball Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institution presidents are frustrated with some institutions 
increasingly spending in unsustainable ways on college sports. Between 2004 and 
2008, the median operating budget among the 120 FBS athletics programs increased by 
46%, to $41 million. The continuing divide between academics and athletics is also a 
challenge, one that is only exacerbated at some institutions by the perception—and the 
reality, in certain instances—that provosts and deans are cutting budgets while athletics 
is awash in money. But the presidents view reform as unrealistic, instead indicating 
that finding the new revenue needed to continue to compete was their only option.
The Knight study addresses nicely the question of what is occurring. But 
why are these behaviors happening? Identifying the challenges, such as financial 
ones, associated with intercollegiate athletics within the FBS is a necessary first 
step toward reform. But success in reform requires a deeper understanding of why 
institutions are acting as they are, even when, for some, it is seemingly not in their 
best financial interests. The question is thus not only whether spending by universi-
ties on intercollegiate athletics is sustainable. It is also why some institutions are 
engaged in such behavior despite such clear signals that it is potentially damaging.
I suggest four reasons why so many universities are spending seemingly beyond 
their means, arguing that legitimacy gained by institutions through FBS athletics is 
more compelling than the sustainability that comes with greater restraint.
• Even with significant financial losses, there are considerable intangible strategic 
advantages associated with prominence in athletics—benefits for institutions 
that are difficult to monetize.
• The arms race in athletics associated with facilities and compensation has direct 
parallels with trends on the academic side of institutions as they become more 
entrepreneurial and commercialized.
• Universities are decidedly more interested than anything in enhancing their 
prestige—and thus available resources, they perceive—even at the expense of 
efficiency.
• Those across higher education are unwilling to draw lines between the haves, who 
can sustain extravagant athletics programs, and the almost-haves and have-nots.
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I conclude that there is a meaningful, but unrecognized (or perhaps ignored), 
line between athletics programs that are subsidized by general university funds 
and those able to generate sufficient resources to be, effectively, independent. 
The problem is thus not really the sustainability of intercollegiate athletics. It is, 
instead, whether institutions that must subsidize the enterprise to compete in the 
FBS are realizing sufficient intangible benefits that advance institutional aspirations 
toward greater prestige—or have a reasonable prospect of someday doing so—thus 
justifying their investment in athletics.
Strategic Advantages
Resource acquisition through effective external relations is what enables the aspi-
rations of essentially local institutions to national standing. Institutions leverage 
various intangible benefits connected with FBS-level athletics in securing the 
resources that serve various broader institutional agendas, including purely aca-
demic ones. Concentrating on these uses of intercollegiate athletics in areas such as 
external affairs requires putting aside important questions related to the mechanics 
of intercollegiate athletics, with its associated allegations of commercialism and 
professionalism—and even corruption and exploitation (Toma, 2003).
Having regular mass spectator sports extravaganzas so directly associated with 
research universities is an accident of history, probably an unfortunate one. But it 
has been the reality in American higher education for over a century. The question 
I have asked is not what can we do about it, recognizing that a typical state flag-
ship is as unlikely to scale back its investment in athletics as it would be to retreat 
from its obsession with advancing in prestige and ranking. Instead, I have found it 
more productive and satisfying to ask how universities do and can use athletics to 
advance broader institutional interests, including academic ones.
The essence of external relations is enhancing identification with an institution 
among constituents. Athletics, when they draw wide attention, as with FBS foot-
ball, allow a community to relate to something that they perceive to be distinctive, 
central, and enduring. They thus want to deepen and announce their affiliation 
(Toma, Hartley, and Dubrow, 2005; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994). Once 
individuals so identify with what become “their” institutions, successful fund raising 
and other positive external relations is a natural result. For instance, the connec-
tions that Nebraskans develop and continue through the Cornhuskers cause them 
to become stalwart supporters of not only teams, but also the university. Athletics 
further provide some—perhaps much, at some universities—of the mystique con-
nected with names and symbols that serve to differentiate institutions from “the 
pack.” The value that comes with these is termed brand equity—the payoff for 
developing a powerful brand. Through a mix of aura and information, strong brands 
communicate readily and in enduring ways what the organization wants people to 
know about it and its products (Toma, Hartley, and Dubrow, 2005; Aaker, 1996).
Organizational identification and brand equity depend upon institutional 
culture. At larger institutions, prominent athletics are unusually useful in establish-
ing and expressing culture in ways expected by constituents such as students and 
alumni. In the inexorably linked quest for prestige and appeal for resources that 
drives strategy, it is insufficient, even at the most prominent research universities, 
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to be only perceived as relevant in research, teaching, and service. Institutions must 
also incorporate the more intimate atmosphere associated with small colleges. 
Spectator sports enable the expression of the collegiate ideal, albeit imperfectly, 
that can be otherwise difficult on larger campuses. Within any organization, a dis-
tinctive culture develops and becomes established through the repeated expression 
of symbols, language, narratives, and practices. At large universities, what gives 
form to culture, making it accessible to people, is predominantly articulated through 
athletics. These are the colors, logos, and mascots (symbols); songs and slogans 
(language); stories, legends, and myths (narratives); and rituals and ceremonials 
(practices) distinctive to an institution (Toma, 2003). Universities tend to have rather 
standards norms, values, and beliefs—it is the forms culture takes that differentiate 
them. Just as the most powerful brands tend to be associated with firms having the 
richest organizational culture, as the culture of an institution strengthens, so does 
identification with it.
Institutions thus become more appealing and accessible (and even relevant) to 
those associated with them—particularly external constituents—through the col-
legiate ideal expressed through spectator sports. Athletics is what many outsiders 
know and like about an institution, making insiders out of local communities that 
extend statewide, prompting them to become passionate advocates and supporters. 
(FBS football may even provide a distraction from activities, such as research in 
the humanities, which can be difficult to justify as directly relevant to the economic 
advancement of a state.) Teams provide a locus for the expression of the pride of 
place that local institutions have long leveraged in garnering support to advance their 
aspirations toward national prominence. Institutions build on these connections, 
quite purposefully, in external relations. Games provide a vehicle to bring people 
onto campus. These might be prospective major donors or key legislators invited to 
the president’s box at the stadium or regular annual fund donors or tuition-paying 
parents sitting in the stands or watching with interest on television. These are, once 
again, people who otherwise may not have a direct means of connection to the 
universities that become a source of pride and even passion for them.
Athletics also provides institutions that are essentially local in their reach with 
what amounts to a national brand, enhancing the credibility of campuses with few 
other areas of real national prominence. Not by choice, of course, it is far more likely 
a university will achieve notice nationally for its football team than for any of its 
academic functions. Spectator sports (along with geography) are what distinguish 
otherwise indistinguishable large universities (and otherwise indistinguishable 
states) on a national level. Institutions that would struggle to make a plausible 
claim to national standing in any academic field, can do so through athletics. As 
universities seek resources from increasingly skeptical local sources, such cred-
ibility matters, even if it is illogical in its basis.
In drawing on athletics in these ways, institutions are simply using available—
and needed—opportunities to their advantage. These uses are intangible in nature, 
difficult to monetize or otherwise value. What value can an institution, particularly 
given aspirations to advance in prestige, put upon developing a national name? 
What is it worth to enhance the appeal and accessibility of a university to local 
constituents? When considering the matter of expenditures exceeding revenues 
in athletics, it is important to factor in these intangible benefits for institutions.1
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Parallels with the Broader Institution
The various arms races that are exacerbating difficulties in balancing athletics bud-
gets without institutions subsidies are parallel with trends within higher education 
more broadly. There are increasing pressures across the university toward com-
mercialism and professionalism. These are most obvious in athletics, as universities 
exhibit ever greater creativity in scheduling football games to earn television fees, 
entering into partnerships with apparel companies and other sponsors, realizing 
the fund raising possibilities connected with selling choice tickets, and so on. As 
costs escalate and appropriations dwindle, universities are similarly becoming 
increasingly entrepreneurial in the academic programs and student amenities they 
offer. The pressures to depart from traditional academic values are similar to the 
incentives to elude the amateur ideal in athletics.
The various strategies that universities and colleges employ toward positioning 
for increased prestige—and thus greater legitimacy—illustrate them acting in an 
entrepreneurial manner that has never been more characteristic of American higher 
education. They are responding to the emergence of the neo-liberal ethos within 
U.S. higher education in the 1980s, emphasizing reliance on markets and attention 
to internal efficiency amid reduced relative state funding. In framing their case for 
public support, universities and colleges no longer solely indicate their contribu-
tions to advancing the public good, but also more often underscore the return on 
investment the provide, as with their contributions to local economic development 
(Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy, 2005). Higher education has increasingly become a 
commodity, its environment marked by intense competition and rampant consum-
erism, its purposes ever more connected with individual gain rather than societal 
good (Marginson, 2006; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Bok, 2002). Traditional 
academic values continue to matter, but are challenged and at an ever-greater risk 
of being compromised.
Within this context, higher education institutions, aside from those that eschew 
any pretense to selectivity, employ a rather predictable set of strategies. They 
intend these efforts to enhance available resources while increasing prestige, these 
thought to be mutually reinforcing (Geiger, 2004; Kirp, 2003; Ehrenberg, 2002; 
Brewer, Gates, and Goldman, 2002). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) address how 
universities are intentionally transforming their purposes toward individual gain 
and away from societal benefit. Acting increasingly as capitalists, institutions are 
seeking resources in new markets and viewing knowledge as a commodity. They 
are doing so through expanding management capacity; restructuring faculty work 
to lower instructional costs (primarily by shifting to temporary labor); subsidiz-
ing researchers (who themselves are increasingly focused upon individual gain); 
and aggressively recruiting accomplished students. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) 
consider the increasing influence of markets in higher education, including the 
impact of globalization—and how research funding has become a critical marker of 
prestige. Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy (2005) note that administration and research 
have both expanded, the former spreading as on a lattice and the latter steadily 
ratcheting upward.
Focusing on how universities and colleges are increasingly marketing them-
selves, as to accomplished students, Kirp (2003) describes institutions as ever more 
entrepreneurial. They are not only ever more professional in framing messages for 
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outsiders, better shaping and managing perceptions, but also launching popular 
undergraduate majors, emphasizing honors programs, and enhancing study abroad 
opportunities. Additionally, even institutions not traditionally widely engaged in 
such activities are seeking strategic advantage through augmenting graduate pro-
grams and encouraging faculty research (Kirp, 2003; Geiger, 2004), just as several 
universities not involved in football are entering the Division I fray. Institutions 
are meanwhile enhancing campus infrastructure, building impressive student 
residences, dining commons, fitness centers, and even shopping districts. As these 
various “arms races” have contributed to escalating discretionary spending, so has 
the nondiscretionary budget increased, with institutions spending more for basic 
services such as health benefits, information technology, and deferred maintenance 
(Zusman, 2005; SCUP, 2005; Lee and Clery, 2004; Dill, 2003; Ehrenberg, 2002). 
Clotfelter (1996) examines the rapid increases in spending at elite institutions, as 
for student services, financial aid, and facilities.
Another impact of the quest for prestige is that the price of higher education is 
increasing, especially at more selective institutions, as recruiting students through 
tuition discounting, is expensive (Geiger, 2004; Ehrenberg, 2002; McPherson and 
Schapiro, 1998). There has been a shift in emphasis from need-based toward “merit” 
student aid at these universities and colleges that is akin to the intense competition 
across athletics recruiting. As with spending “what it takes” to attract top coaches, 
among research universities (or aspiring ones), there is also a robust market for 
faculty thought to be able to conduct research with significant funding or com-
mercial potential (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Geiger, 2004; Kirp, 2003). Geiger 
(2004) focuses on finances, undergraduates, research, and industry ties at research 
universities that are increasingly less able to control their own activities, doing 
less public service and enjoying less government support. He argues that with the 
ascent of the market in higher education there is a marked and increasing inequality 
among institutions, with public universities disadvantaged. These same disparities 
between and among haves, almost-haves, and have-nots are only increasing across 
intercollegiate athletics. Also as in athletics, there are escalating imbalances within 
institutions, as units compete with one another and some, like business schools, are 
better positioned in a market-centered environment (Ehrenberg, 2002).2
In response to these pressures, both universities and their athletic programs 
are increasingly relying on revenues generated at their more agile peripheries. In 
athletics, among major conference programs, there is the ever-greater presence 
of—and reliance upon—revenue generated from television, sponsorships, and 
merchandising. Similarly increasing in prominence are academic programs offered 
at satellite sites or virtual platforms and addressed to working students studying 
in professional fields (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Bok, 2002; Zemsky, Wegner, 
and Massy, 2005; Newman, Couturier, and Scurry, 2004). Institutions have entre-
preneurial, as opposed to democratizing, purposes for these programs (Bok, 2002), 
with students within them primarily interested in credentialing (Collis, 2004; 
Newman, Couturier, and Scurry, 2004). Managers tend to shape these peripheral 
academic programs, which are typically staffed by temporary faculty or regular 
faculty on overload, causing traditional faculty influence to be less pronounced 
(Bousquet, 2008; Rhoades, 2005; Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy, 2005; Slaughter 
and Rhoades, 2004). Additionally, institutions have attempted to contain costs 
(aside from engaging in various arms races) through outsourcing and otherwise 
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seeking efficiencies—and other private sector management ideas have permeated 
higher education (Zemsky, Wegner, and Massy, 2005; Kirp, 2003). Institutions are 
particularly seeking lower expenses and greater agility through redirecting faculty 
staffing away from tenure significant positions toward temporary, part-time, and 
adjunct ones (Bousquet, 2008; Collis, 2004; Lee and Clery, 2004; Zusman, 2005; 
Gayle, Tewarie, and White, 2003).
Kirp argues that higher education is evolving into just another business, one 
in which richer institutions (and units and individuals) get richer. Bok (2002), too, 
examines commercialism, focusing on athletics, scientific research, and academic 
programs, lamenting what he argues is an obsession over meaningless measures, 
such as those associated with rankings. But obsessively pursuing and measuring 
prestige provides a useful surrogate for increasing shareholder value or bottom line 
profits as an outcome, consistent with a neo-liberal framework. One of several chal-
lenges is that it also exacerbates the mission inflation or academic drift that comes 
with institutions being naturally isomorphic, as with a regional comprehensive 
university seeking to assume the characteristics of a state flagship (Clark, 1983, 
Aldersley, 1995; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In addi-
tion, Collis (2004) cautions against mission creep, where “each succeeding tier of 
the periphery pursues new directions of its own accord” (p. 63), risking expanding 
everywhere into the periphery and failing to commit sufficient scarce resources 
to any one venture—the inability to prioritize, in other words. Nevertheless, even 
the most entrepreneurial institution still must consider measures such as retention, 
satisfying various accreditation and accountability requirement. Traditional values 
have hardly been abandoned, even as they are challenged within the neo-liberal 
university. Athletics may actually be in a more advantageous situation here, as 
measures such as wins and graduation rates, while still flawed, may be more telling 
about accomplishments (and even quality) than the reputational rankings.3
But despite these commonalities, we continue to focus on the divide between 
the academics and athletics. Academics and athletics persistently, but needlessly, 
function as adversaries, rarely working jointly on shared issues or even drawing 
on the experience of the other to improve practice. Such an illusory divide results 
from faculty members and academic administrators reducing college sports to ste-
reotypes and favoring an “us versus them” orientation. Even those most interested 
in these issues can take an overly romantic and thus insufficiently complex view of 
the realities of both the contemporary university and intercollegiate athletics within 
it. Arguments of the “we need to just get rid of athletics” type are as unrealistic as 
those contending “all would be well at the university if the state would support us 
as they once did.” The same is true of most who have written specifically about 
college sports. Meanwhile, athletic leaders are often insulated from academe, too 
commonly failing to understand the norms, values, and beliefs that are so impor-
tant in framing issues. They can fail to appreciate the great distinctions between 
institution types, to choose just one example. World-renowned research universities 
and regional teaching-focused institutions are simply portrayed as participants in 
the FBS, even thought the average SAT scores of entering students may be 300 
or 400 points different—the difference between being in the top 10%, as at a top 
state flagship such as the University of Florida, and bottom 25% of those taking the 
test. Sports reporters, who rarely venture from the stadium onto the actual campus, 
exhibit the same lack of perspective.
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Both sides criticize the other without really acknowledging the contexts in 
which the other operates—and neither recognizes that trends and issues in both 
academe and athletics are often more alike than they are different. This fundamen-
tal misunderstanding invites problems and marks a lost opportunity. The crises 
in athletics that can prove so burdensome to university administrations, often in 
an excruciatingly public manner, are often attributable to a failure in athletics to 
comprehend the values and mores of academic life. Meanwhile, trends and issues 
in athletics related to commercialism and professionalism, framed properly, can be 
illustrative in considering the fundamental questions that academe is asking about 
maintaining its own values in an environment increasingly marked by external 
pressures.
Legitimacy and Isomorphism
Another explanation for why institutions are seemingly willing to take losses in 
athletics, as necessary, comes from neo-institutional theory. Even as an almost-
have or have-not in athletics, modeling behavior—including spending—on the 
haves lends legitimacy to an institution. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
organizations are more interested in legitimizing themselves through reference to 
other organizations than seeking efficiency within themselves. In doing so, their 
access to resources is less likely to be disrupted, reducing turbulence and main-
taining stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutions thus act to “increase their 
legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of 
the acquired practices and procedures” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 340). Given 
a choice between responsible spending and investing toward being perceived as 
among the leaders in an industry, universities are strongly inclined toward the latter. 
Accordingly, organizations across types become more homogenous over time, 
eventually adopting the innovations and practices of those perceived to be atop a 
field, as these become the prevailing wisdom. If the institutions with the leading 
athletic programs enter into facilities and compensation arms races, others interested 
in continuing in the FBS will thus engage in similar behavior to the extent possible.
Such institutional isomorphism is driven both by responding to markets (com-
petitive isomorphism) and competition for political and organizational legitimacy 
(institutional isomorphism). It is, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991), 
coercive, mimetic, or normative. Coercive pressures can come from those upon 
whom institutions depend for resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982) 
or through formal regulation. In higher education, the need to secure annual state 
appropriations has a coercive effect on the actions of universities and colleges, as 
in developing a vision and various strategies to implement it. Boosters can have a 
similar coercive effect on athletic programs endeavoring to replicate those viewed 
as being at the top. Mimetic isomorphism is grounded in reducing uncertainty, with 
imitating market leaders providing reassurance, as there is less risk for universities 
or colleges in not stepping out from the herd. Consider the risk assumed by the 
athletic director (or university president) who decides not to pay the large salary 
or construct the football facility—and compare that with the risks associated with 
overspending. Normative forces come from those within an organization having 
been, and continuing to be, acculturated as professionals first as graduate students 
and later within practitioner networks, thus acquiring a sense of what structures 
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and processes are legitimate.4 Like faculty members attempting to reshape their 
current positions and institutions toward being like the leading graduate schools 
at which they trained, coaches and athletic directors tend to be influenced by their 
time at the top programs, seeking to bring Oklahoma or Penn State to Louisiana 
Tech or Buffalo.
Institutions tend not to directly announce their isomorphic tendencies. They 
also tend to behave in ways other than what they purport or perhaps even want, 
developing “rationalized myths.” These are stories that sometimes have little con-
nection with reality, but reinforce stated institutional purposes toward reassuring 
both those within an organization, and outsiders. For instance, a small college may 
frame itself as a traditional liberal arts college both internally and externally, even 
when the bulk of its activities consist of teaching professional degree courses to 
part-time, adult students on a satellite campus (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). Another 
rationalized myth would be an institution hanging on in the FBS despite the need 
for considerable subsidies and having a budget that is a small faction of leading 
institutions, but not wanting to lose being associated with the leading universities 
and athletic programs nationally. Similarly, institutions rely upon ceremony to signal 
legitimacy, again both to themselves and outsiders (Jepperson, 1991). It is not nec-
essary for the notions that these ceremonies represent to be proven effective, they 
only must be believed in (March and Olsen, 1989). Such rationalizations are thus 
influential in both setting ambitions and later pronouncements about having realized 
them. Universities and colleges, like other organizations, are not troubled about 
perceiving and announcing themselves as something other than they actually are.
Another driver toward isomorphism, as reflected in spending, may be that 
organizational culture tends to limit the solutions that institutions view as legiti-
mate, so they “satisfice,” limiting themselves to a few of many possible paths 
(Simon, 1997). For universities interested in national standing, FBS athletics is 
among these. Especially when tied to institutional advancement, it is a comfortable 
strategic direction and an “easy sell” to seemingly all constituents on a campus. 
Finally, universities are loosely coupled, which means central control over—and 
even coordination among—units and individuals tends to be weak. Across research 
universities, those with independent bases of influence and resources, like athletics 
(but also entrepreneurial faculty), can operate rather autonomously (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2003, 2001). Unless those in athletics are interested in cost 
reduction, it is unlikely that central administrations can impose it—and given the 
pull of legitimacy through isomorphism, presidents are probably no inclined to 
push here.
Drawing Lines in U.S. Higher Education
Noting that university presidents are concerned about the sustainability of spending 
on college sports requires a significant qualification—that there is no real crisis 
among the relative few haves among athletics programs. These haves are generating 
sufficient revenue to manage without subsidies from their institutions, even while 
spending aggressively. But few are willing to draw—or simply articulate—such 
lines, whether in athletics or elsewhere in higher education. Everyone, regardless 
of resources that can be a fraction of leading institutions, can simply claim a posi-
tion within the top classification, whether in the FBS or as a research university.
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For instance, the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, and the University of Wyoming would all label themselves—and 
be classified, as by Carnegie—as research universities. But Michigan has 20 
times more in both research expenditures and endowment assets than UWM and 
Wyoming, ranked 200th in these respective areas. Similarly, among the roughly 
330 programs in Division I intercollegiate athletics, Ohio State generates and 
spends about $90 million annually (using 2006 data). The smallest programs 
in the division, institutions such as Nicholls State, Maryland-Eastern Shore, 
and North Carolina-Asheville, have yearly budgets about three percent of that. 
Conference television contracts are similar in proportion. Beginning in 2009, the 
Southeastern Conference (SEC) began receiving $55 million from CBS and $150 
million annually from ESPN-ABC through broadcast rights contracts—$205 
million in total. Splitting these revenues among the 12 athletics programs in the 
conference accounts for about $17 million of their respective budgets. In contrast 
to the SEC, the Mountain West Conference television deal is closer to $12 million 
per year, while the Western Athletic Conference contract is closer to $4 million 
and the Mid-American Conference is about $1.5 million.5 Bowl revenue is also 
apportioned to FBS conferences along these lines.6
Even among the 66 programs in the six leading conferences (and Notre Dame) 
that comprise the Bowl Coalition Series (BCS)—those with the most modest 
budgets, such as Cincinnati, are one-third that of Ohio State. In the Southeastern 
Conference, Florida and Georgia, in the top ten or so nationally, have budgets that 
are more than twice those of Mississippi State and Vanderbilt. The same is the case 
with research and endowments. Virginia Tech was 50th in research funding at $290 
million and the University of California-San Francisco was 50th in endowment at 
$1.2 billion—both about one-third of Michigan. Even within the Association of 
American Universities (AAU), members such as Kansas and Nebraska generate 
revenues from tuition, appropriations, research, and endowments sufficiently dif-
ferent from Wisconsin and Berkeley—not to mention Stanford and Yale—that it 
is probably not all that useful to put them in the same category for the purposes 
of comparison.
A clear line between the have-nots and others is “guarantee” games in foot-
ball—something to which there is not an obvious comparison elsewhere in higher 
education. These involve a more prominent program hosting at a team from one 
of the smaller FBS institutions or from the former Division I-AA (the Football 
Championship Subdivision or FCS). The more modest program earns a payment 
for visiting, with more attractive guarantee games involving FBS teams now attract-
ing in the $1 million range, with FBS games generating about one-third of that. 
And a market has developed around the smaller programs shopping themselves 
among the larger ones, driving up prices. These games are essential to less wealthy 
FBS programs and to FCS teams, given their budgets closer are $20 million (and 
sometimes more like $10 million), and the limits to their ability to generate rev-
enue otherwise, as from television. So, Arkansas State played at Nebraska, Iowa, 
and Louisville in 2009 and FCS member Charleston Southern visited Florida and 
South Florida. Meanwhile, home games in larger stadiums can generate upwards 
of $7 million, when factoring in everything, so adding a seventh home game is also 
important to the bottom line at the haves, appetites for revenue seemingly being 
insatiable in college sports, as in higher education generally.
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But the primary line between the haves, almost-haves, and have-nots is in 
program subsidies. Georgia, which receives only a negligible institutional subsidy, 
generated about $75 million in revenue in 2006, with a surplus of about $25 mil-
lion and nearly $60 million in reserves at the beginning of 2009. In addition to 
SEC and local television revenue and other sources such as sponsorships, Georgia 
generates about $18 million in football ticket sales each year and another $4 mil-
lion in revenue from suites—and $26 million in donations to preserve the right of 
donors to purchase tickets. (Over one-third of total annual fund raising at UGA of 
roughly $100 million is in athletics.) It recently completed the construction of a 
$35 million basketball and gymnastics practice facility and broke ground on a $40 
million football building addition in 2009.
Rutgers, an almost-have, has a budget closer to $40 million—around 50th 
among institutions nationally—raising $4 million in athletic donations. But Rut-
gers athletics receives a nearly $15 million in direct and indirect support from 
the university, as well as over $5 million in student fees. It spends about the $12 
million annually that Georgia does on football. Representative of the have-nots, 
Eastern Michigan has a $20 million annual budget, generated through $7 million 
from student fees, $2 million from state funds, and $8 million in institution support, 
both direct and indirect. (Direct support is in the form of tuition waivers or actual 
transfers, while indirect support involves the use of facilities and staff from the 
universities.) EMU generates minimal funds through tickets sales, contributions 
from individuals, conference distributions, and other sources. It spends about $4 
million on football annually.
Tables 1 and 2 portray these differences in FBS public institutions in six states 
(Georgia, Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia). The lines between 
the haves, almost-haves, and have-nots are clear. Not only is athletics revenue among 
the Mid-American Conference programs at the bottom of the table one-quarter to 
one-sixth of top programs such as Ohio State, Michigan, Georgia, Virginia, and 
Michigan State, but football spending is also in the one-third range. Most of the 
budget for these have-not programs comes from institutional transfers or student 
fees and each takes a significant loss on football.
The issue of subsidies has become more pronounced, given cuts in institutional 
budgets over the past two years. The University of Georgia experienced cuts in 
its state budget of about $500 million of eight percent in 2008 and ten percent in 
2009. The institution imposed on employees six days of state-mandated furloughs 
in 2009, constituting a three percent temporary pay cut, but has resisted layoffs. At 
institutions that subsidize athletics, such cuts would occur there also. At Stanford, 
for instance, 40% of the yearly athletic budget of around $72 million is generated 
from a combination of endowed funds and almost $10 million in transfers from 
the institution. Stanford athletics also draws on $12 million in expendable gifts 
annually. With endowments declining steeply beginning last year and correspond-
ing cuts in institutional spending, Stanford has been forced to make significant 
reductions in athletics spending, including eliminating positions, with $8 million 
in cuts anticipated in 2010 and 2011.7
As with television contracts, such budget cuts will only increase the separa-
tion between the haves and everyone else in intercollegiate athletics. There has 
been a similar trend across higher education, with the separation between private 
and public higher education increasing (Geiger, 2004). Only the steep decline in 
    61
Ta
b
le
 1
 
A
th
le
ti
cs
 R
ev
en
u
e 
at
 F
B
S
 U
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
 in
 S
ix
 S
ta
te
s
FY
 2
00
6,
 In
di
an
ap
ol
is
 S
ta
r 
an
d 
C
ou
nc
il 
fo
r 
th
e 
A
id
 o
f E
du
ca
tio
n
A
th
le
tic
s 
R
ev
en
ue
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
M
ar
gi
n 
(R
ev
en
ue
s 
Le
ss
 
E
xp
en
d.
)
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
A
th
le
tic
s 
Fu
nd
 R
ai
si
ng
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
A
th
le
tic
s 
Fu
nd
 
R
ai
si
ng
 a
s 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
To
ta
l I
ns
t. 
Fu
nd
 
R
ai
si
ng
O
hi
o 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$8
9,
70
0,
97
9
1
$1
20
,6
74
74
$1
9,
82
9,
55
6
7
8.
6%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
M
ic
hi
ga
n
$7
8,
42
4,
18
6
3
$1
7,
03
7,
04
2
2
$1
6,
34
2,
62
0
12
6.
1%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
G
eo
rg
ia
$6
8,
78
7,
38
4
7
$2
3,
85
4,
32
9
1
$2
8,
30
5,
81
7
1
28
.9
%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f V
ir
gi
ni
a
$6
3,
06
0,
54
0
9
$3
,2
35
,1
37
14
$2
7,
84
9,
39
1
2
11
.4
%
M
ic
hi
ga
n 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$6
2,
28
7,
19
2
11
$3
,8
29
,2
93
13
$1
2,
27
1,
67
7
18
11
.9
%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
at
 C
ha
pe
l H
ill
$5
4,
83
8,
85
1
16
$2
20
,9
71
63
$1
0,
83
4,
44
0
24
4.
4%
V
ir
gi
ni
a 
Po
ly
te
ch
ni
c 
In
st
itu
te
 a
nd
 S
ta
te
 U
.
$4
5,
73
0,
48
5
30
$8
,2
65
,3
56
4
$1
0,
57
0,
44
5
25
12
.4
%
G
eo
rg
ia
 I
ns
tit
ut
e 
of
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
$4
3,
15
3,
70
7
33
$2
,2
11
,5
93
18
$7
,0
10
,8
91
39
6.
8%
R
ut
ge
rs
, T
he
 S
ta
te
 U
. o
f 
N
ew
 J
er
se
y
$3
7,
99
7,
62
9
40
$0
10
4
$4
,2
51
,9
44
52
5.
2%
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$3
5,
79
3,
67
0
44
-$
1,
22
5,
12
4
15
7
$5
,9
08
,4
78
45
4.
1%
E
as
t C
ar
ol
in
a 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$2
1,
12
8,
21
9
61
-$
63
4,
82
2
15
1
$3
,8
44
,3
13
56
19
.7
%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
C
in
ci
nn
at
i
$2
1,
12
4,
17
6
62
-$
4,
12
3,
34
8
16
4
$4
,9
94
,5
18
47
6.
6%
M
ia
m
i U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$2
0,
55
8,
28
7
64
$5
02
,7
20
44
$7
73
,3
20
10
4
2.
7%
E
as
te
rn
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
9,
96
1,
10
7
66
$2
11
,9
09
66
$4
75
,0
07
12
8
6.
0%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
To
le
do
$1
7,
09
1,
66
5
75
$2
,7
81
,1
19
15
$1
,3
07
,8
27
84
14
.5
%
C
en
tr
al
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
6,
76
8,
66
8
76
$0
10
4
$1
,1
06
,8
07
89
8.
2%
B
ow
lin
g 
G
re
en
 S
ta
te
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
6,
73
0,
52
3
77
$3
18
,9
94
58
$2
,1
70
,3
82
72
10
.1
%
K
en
t S
ta
te
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
5,
71
2,
74
2
80
$4
89
,6
65
45
$3
38
,6
51
14
1
2.
3%
O
hi
o 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
4,
45
7,
89
6
85
-$
52
8,
55
2
14
6
$6
73
,9
89
11
2
4.
7%
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f A
kr
on
$1
4,
02
1,
91
4
89
$1
25
,4
58
72
$4
52
,1
09
13
1
1.
8%
62
Ta
b
le
 2
 
M
ar
g
in
 o
n
 F
o
o
tb
al
l a
t 
F
B
S
 U
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
 in
 S
ix
 S
ta
te
s
FY
 2
00
6,
 In
di
an
ap
ol
is
 S
ta
r 
an
d 
C
ou
nc
il 
fo
r 
th
e 
A
id
 o
f E
du
ca
tio
n
D
ire
ct
, 
In
di
re
ct
, a
nd
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
S
up
po
rt
S
tu
de
nt
 F
ee
s
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
Fo
ot
ba
ll 
S
pe
nd
in
g 
(O
pe
ra
tin
g)
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
Fo
ot
ba
ll 
M
ar
gi
n
A
ll 
Pu
b 
D
-I 
FB
S
 
an
d 
FC
S
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
G
eo
rg
ia
$0
$3
,0
28
,8
78
65
$1
2,
53
2,
49
5
19
$3
8,
36
3,
34
3
2
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
M
ic
hi
ga
n
$0
$0
13
9
$1
0,
69
0,
87
4
28
$3
5,
70
5,
23
3
3
O
hi
o 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$5
,4
29
$0
13
9
$2
5,
71
1,
47
8
1
$2
6,
09
9,
12
9
7
M
ic
hi
ga
n 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$3
,1
54
,2
88
$0
13
9
$1
3,
73
3,
69
9
12
$1
5,
56
3,
64
1
12
V
ir
gi
ni
a 
Po
ly
te
ch
ni
c 
In
st
itu
te
 a
nd
 S
ta
te
 U
.
$3
24
,4
69
$5
,8
40
,9
58
29
$1
4,
01
2,
45
3
9
$1
1,
30
5,
86
6
20
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$0
$2
,3
98
,4
16
85
$6
,8
51
,2
08
52
$9
,1
88
,0
66
24
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a 
at
 C
ha
pe
l H
ill
$3
,0
60
,5
64
$2
,4
54
,9
49
80
$1
0,
56
9,
16
2
30
$6
,9
78
,8
44
32
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f V
ir
gi
ni
a
$0
$7
,9
73
,0
32
13
$1
6,
81
2,
58
2
5
$4
91
,8
68
54
R
ut
ge
rs
, T
he
 S
ta
te
 U
. o
f 
N
ew
 J
er
se
y
$1
4,
56
7,
04
9
$5
,3
14
,9
05
36
$1
0,
73
1,
67
6
27
$0
61
M
ia
m
i U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$4
,1
70
,9
76
$1
0,
29
1,
12
0
4
$4
,5
45
,3
11
68
$0
61
C
en
tr
al
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
1,
90
8,
60
1
$0
0
$3
,5
72
,2
22
84
$0
61
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f A
kr
on
$1
2,
69
5
$1
0,
25
9,
61
5
5
$3
,8
62
,0
21
78
-$
31
,1
38
10
3
E
as
t C
ar
ol
in
a 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$2
,0
07
,3
89
$6
,6
63
,9
61
22
$5
,8
78
,8
69
57
-$
86
6,
54
0
12
8
O
hi
o 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$5
13
,9
20
$1
0,
19
9,
55
8
6
$3
,7
90
,0
77
80
-$
92
0,
53
9
12
9
E
as
te
rn
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
0,
12
7,
24
0
$7
,0
08
,4
03
18
$4
,3
85
,8
08
71
-$
1,
28
2,
34
2
14
0
B
ow
lin
g 
G
re
en
 S
ta
te
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$1
,2
95
,3
77
$8
,5
87
,1
15
12
$4
,0
22
,6
40
75
-$
1,
39
2,
06
5
14
3
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
C
in
ci
nn
at
i
$5
,6
42
,8
52
$0
13
9
$7
,1
17
,5
44
45
-$
1,
87
7,
44
1
15
3
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
To
le
do
$1
,7
07
,7
70
$8
,8
34
,7
55
11
$3
,9
31
,2
78
77
-$
2,
16
2,
28
7
15
4
K
en
t S
ta
te
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
$3
,3
57
,6
80
$9
,0
15
,9
00
9
$3
,4
63
,4
73
86
-$
2,
67
0,
40
8
15
8
G
eo
rg
ia
 I
ns
tit
ut
e 
of
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
$5
57
,7
60
$1
,9
76
,8
02
89
$1
2,
84
7,
46
5
18
-$
2,
67
2,
96
4
15
9
Why Legitimacy is More Compelling than Sustainability    63
endowments in 2008 and 2009, which have been similar—if not worse—than cuts 
in state appropriations, have slowed the trend. But in athletics, leading programs, 
like Georgia, are little affected by the global economic crisis—and are increasing 
the distance between themselves and everyone else.
None of this is to say that universities or athletics programs with lesser resources 
cannot compete favorably. It is simply to suggest that those at the top have significant 
advantages. They are likely to prevail more often than not in the most intense com-
petitions, as for the most desirable students, elite researchers, impressive donations 
(and perhaps even research funding)—as well as on the field. The national champi-
ons in football since 1998—Florida, Louisiana State, Texas, Southern California, 
Ohio State, Miami, Oklahoma, Florida State, and Tennessee—are in the top 25 in 
resources devoted to athletics (with the exception of Miami). So, there are lines in 
college sports apart from the FBS, or even the BCS, versus others. The 20 or 30 
programs and institutions able to generate the most revenue are racing ahead, with 
another group of 30 or 40 doing what they can to keep pace, but with little prospect 
of actually doing so. Several others are simply content to make a plausible case 
that they live in the same neighborhood, albeit in a much smaller house. The same 
is true among research universities in roughly similar proportions.
Concluding Thoughts
Why does Eastern Michigan University subsidize nearly its entire $20 million ath-
letics budget? There have to be more appropriate purposes for these funds within 
a higher education institution, right? There is a student development rationale for 
sports such as volleyball and swimming, but hardly for the football and men’s 
basketball at the Division I level that consume so many resources. Instead, the 
university is investing as it does elsewhere in external relations, building the image 
and extending the reach of the institution. Universities such as EMU justify taking 
annual losses on intercollegiate athletics given the hope that they will someday be 
able to benefit from the advantages associated with athletics prominence. These 
include the ability to more readily connect with alumni and potential donors; having 
a more concrete national identity and higher profile among local constituents; and 
fitting more neatly within the popular conception of a major American university.
In response to such concerns, Georgia State, Texas-San Antonio, and UNC-
Charlotte are all launching Division I-AA football programs. Having constructed 
on-campus housing, dining, and fitness facilities, each perceives football as the 
missing piece in being considered a “real” university by the accomplished students 
they are attempting to enroll to enhance their U.S. News rankings. While there are 
occasional success stories, such as the emergence of South Florida over the past 
decade as a prominent football program, new teams are likely to struggle financially 
for several years. But the opportunity to be more like the universities that these 
institutions aspire to become—state flagships such as Georgia Tech, Texas A&M, 
and N.C. State—is worth it, seemingly regardless of the expense. Ultimately, Eastern 
Michigan is unlikely to ever break away from annual subsidies for athletics. It is 
purchasing membership in the group of 120 or so institutions in the top division in 
college sports, which is important not only strategically, but also for its psyche. Its 
pursuit of research funding and graduate programs may be similar—and probably 
even more expensive.
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Given the “aspirational” ends institutions intend them to serve, I am hesitant 
to criticize subsidies for athletics. Part of what makes American higher education 
so dynamic is that universities and colleges are so ambitious—everyone is con-
stantly seeking that next level of stature. There is nothing quite so challenging for 
an institution as attempting to keep pace when market leaders are moving ahead so 
rapidly. But is opting out really an option for EMU? Can its president realistically 
say that the institution is simply going to consolidate its gains and move away 
from attempting to ever compete, including symbolically on the field, with the 
neighboring University of Michigan?8
Notes
1. I develop these arguments in Football U.: Spectator Sports in the Life of the American 
University (2003). I also include them in a chapter with Dennis Kramer to introduce an edited 
volume titled: The Uses of Intercollegiate Athletics: Opportunities and Challenges in Positioning 
the University (2009).
2. In addition to the standard works on the neo-liberal university, there is a robust literature 
critical of contemporary higher education. In just the past few years, Lewis (2006) writes of the 
lack of coherence in the curriculum, faculty disconnectedness from students, and coddled and 
infantilized students at Harvard; Bok (2007) and Kronman (2007) discuss what students are not 
learning (including the meaning of life, the latter argues); Giroux (2007) and Newfield (2008) 
focus on the influence of conservatives in, respectively, chilling critical thought and suppressing 
democratizing impulses in higher education; Golden (2007) and Schmidt (2007) consider the 
advantages affluent applicants have in elite admissions; Rhode (2006) addresses the negative 
impact of the pursuit of status on the pursuit of knowledge (as do, more generally, Hersh and 
Merrow (2006)); Washburn (2006) discusses negative corporate influences; and Bousquet (2008) 
explores faculty as disposable workers within the low-wage sphere of the service economy. Finally, 
Burgan (2006) writes of decline of faculty influence and its impact.
3. I illustrate these trends in the Toma (2008) paper on which I draw the text above, as well as 
in my 2010 book, Building Organizational Capacity: Strategic Management in Higher Education. 
The two paragraphs following are from the introduction to my edited monograph cowritten with 
Dennis Kramer.
4. Organizational institutionalism is the dominant theory in organizations and management, 
with citations to Meyer and Rowen (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) related to institutional theory and resource dependency increasing over the past decade 
(Greenwood, et al., 2008). Subsequent research has only made institutionalism more complex 
and applicable as a theory, as with expanding consideration of questions of isomorphism and 
legitimacy into areas such as institutional entrepreneurship (active change within organizations) 
and institutional logics (influence of broader belief systems, such as capitalism) (Leca, Battilana, 
and Boxenbaum, 2006; Friedland and Alford, 1991).
5. These differences are likely to accelerate. The new $205 million annual SEC contract is 
a significant increase, for instance. In 2007, the conference shared $127 million among its 12 
members, an increase from $16 million in 1990. In addition, each SEC program can negotiate its 
own local broadcasting package, with Florida and Georgia receiving in the neighborhood of $10 
million yearly (Toma, 2009). These possibilities are severely limited for other programs, even 
some in smaller markets in the SEC. In addition, there is the revenue the conferences receive from 
bowl games, which can be as high as $50 million in the SEC. Smaller programs and conferences 
earn a small fraction of these amounts—somewhere between a fifth and a tenth. Revenue from 
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NCAA distributions associated with its annual men’s basketball tournament is also generated 
through a formula that favors larger conferences.
6. For instance, BCS games generate $17 million per participant, which is pooled by confer-
ences and allocated to members. The next tier of lucrative bowls (including the Cotton, Capital 
One, Outback, Gator) are also sponsored by corporations and essentially reserved from teams 
from the six largest conferences. There are 25 or so bowls other than the BCS games, many 
available to teams from smaller conferences, but with payouts in the $1 million per team range. 
Programs often take a loss on these games, as they must cover certain travel expenses and purchase 
a significant block of tickets that they may not be able to resell. Even the best-case scenario for 
smaller programs is thus not particularly appealing. Michael Oriard (2008) contends that occa-
sional forays into the BCS by non-BCS institutions is misleading: “The occasional upset and 
rogue title contender shouldn’t obscure the fact that mostly, the same schools contend for the 
championship each year. . . . These outliers break through one at a time, then promptly lose their 
coach to a major BCS power temporarily fallen on hard times (or lose their star quarterback to the 
NFL) and once again take their proper places in the food chain.” The only potential leverage the 
smaller programs have is in the courts or through federal legislation. The present bowl system is 
questionable under antitrust law, which applies to intercollegiate sports and weighs procompetitive 
benefits against anticompetitive effects when looking at monopolistic practices. If challenged in 
court by a class of perceived Division I FBS outsiders, as is regularly threatened, the question 
would become whether the anticompetitive effects of the BCS system within the FBS, given its 
relative exclusivity, outweigh the procompetitive impacts. Legislation could have the same impact 
of applying the antitrust laws to the bowl system, a prospect most recently raised by Senator Hatch 
after an undefeated Utah team was denied an appearance in the national championship game in 
2009. So far, the BCS has dodged legal or legislative trouble by opening access to the BCS to a 
team from the smaller conferences and making an annual transfer payment.
7. Mike Cross has been tracking such cuts across U.S. intercollegiate athletics at www.ulit-
matesportsinsider.com.
8. What might change the situation—and not necessarily for the better—is the potential loss by 
college football of its tax-exempt status. For over a century, the sport has been associated with the 
corporate sponsorships, races to build impressive facilities that go well beyond function toward opu-
lence, salaries for coaches far in excess of others on campus, etc. that define contemporary college 
football. But these commercial and professional traits have become increasingly conspicuous, with 
major donations to the athletic foundation required for access to good seats and television asserting 
ever more influence over scheduling. Such attributes connect college football as much with com-
merce as with higher education—perhaps more so. The NCAA and its member institutions have, by 
necessity over time, exhibited great skill in framing football as amateur in character. Maintaining 
a plausible connection to the accepted missions of universities, including developing character in 
students through extracurricular activities, enables the enterprise itself. It is what allows college 
football, even with its commercial and professional nature, to fit within the university—and thus have 
a value to society such that it is exempt from federal and local taxation. Were football programs to 
be taxed, already stretched budgets for many programs would perhaps snap. In addition to having to 
pay taxes, the inability to any longer make plausible claims to amateurism might raise the possibility 
of players being able to collectively bargain (as graduate student teaching assistants at public institu-
tions can). It might also encourage the elimination of the tax breaks that drive private donations to 
athletic programs, including for luxury seating. There would be no choice but to contract athletics 
spending, including at the wealthiest programs, and smaller budget programs might be forced into 
more of a Division II or III model. As commercial activity increases and fund raising becomes ever 
more important across institutions, particularly research universities, such a precedent could prove 
to be dangerous outside of college sports. Like in college football, is the ability of the research 
university to claim “amateur” status compromised by its increasingly commercial character?
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